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"THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE...":
TOWARD A METATHEORY OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
THOMAS E. BAKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
Those fifty-four words exemplify a basic dualism running
throughout our constitutional heritage. The history and tradition
of the document comprehend a tension between two very different
sets of concerns. On the one hand, the Constitution serves as an
ideal, the article of our political faith. Aspirational concerns for in-
dividual self-fulfillment and government morality, at times,
predominate constitutional analysis. On the other hand, more im-
mediate and pragmatic concerns often have determined the consti-
tutional course. Felt necessities of political boundaries, organiza-
tional arrangements, and institutional integrity also are prominent
in the governing arts. So it has been for the fourth amendment.
The amendment expresses a philosophy that aspires toward an
abiding government respect for the individual and individual pri-
vacy. At the same time, it recognizes a practical governmental au-
thority to seek out and punish law violators. The people have two
rights to be secure, first, from government and, second, from each
other.
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. The author owes an intellectual debt to the
opinions of countless jurists in the common law tradition and to the previous scholarship of
many others, especially: F. Allen, A. Amsterdam, R. Bacigal, R. Bloom, J. Grano, S. Huf-
stedler, W. LaFave, H. Lasson, C. Moylan, P. Polyviou, R. Posner, S. Saltzburg, T. Taylor,
L. Tribe (who originated this approach), A. Westin, L. Weinreb, and J. White.
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While the duality of the aspirational and the pragmatic under-
lies all of constitutional law, the theory of the fourth amendment
has been brought into high relief by the conjunction of the warrant
clause with the reasonableness clause. Ultimately, the theory of the
amendment is the theory of this conjunction. That theory, how-
ever, is in doctrinal disarray. The case law is a surrealistic series of
holdings about the constitutionality of particular searches and
seizures. The fourth amendment scholarship likewise suffers from
a profound dissonance, as commentators defend their preferred ju-
rist's position or posit their own theoretical construct.
The point of this essay is that, before we can understand or eval-
uate fourth amendment theory, we should consider what form the
ideal theory should take. What is not needed is still another fourth
amendment theory. To develop a set of criteria for understanding
and evaluating existing theory, one must escape to a higher level of
abstraction and consider what would be an ideal theory. This
metatheory, or theory of theories, may sound somewhat metaphys-
ical. It is a bit like going beyond counting-to choreographing-the
angels' proverbial dance on the head of the pin. First, we must de-
scribe the premises-the propositions and assumptions upon
which a fourth amendment theory is based. Second, we must con-
sider the structure of the theory-how it is put together. Third, we
must create an acceptable methodology-the proper procedures
and techniques of analysis of search and seizure issues. Fourth, we
must demarcate boundaries-limits of content and substance
within which the theory operates and beyond which the theory has
no force or effect.
This introduction has the smell of the scholar's lamp, and its
smoke may do more to cloud than its light to illuminate. Any
thoughtful effort to understand law, however, demands serious at-
tention to theory. Discussion of the metatheory sequence should
shed some light on the theory of the fourth amendment, including
existing theory and how it can be improved.
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II. PREMISES
It is true also of journeys in the law that the place you reach
depends on the direction you are taking. And so, where one
comes out on a case depends on where one goes in.2
An ideal theory builds on a small number of broadly stated but
basic assumptions. These premises should be self-justified, two di-
mensional, complementary, broad, and realistic, but first must be
articulated clearly. The universally recognized lack of consistency
and clarity in fourth amendment theory may be traced to a judicial
failure to articulate its underlying premises. For example, a still
unanswered question is whether the amendment is oriented toward
an individual perspective, emphasizing the protection of individual
rights, or toward a regulatory perspective, emphasizing general
limitations on police activity, or toward both, depending on the is-
sue. More important than which orientation is chosen is that the
choice be explicit in the theory.
We must articulate the appropriate philosophical referents for
finding and protecting fourth amendment interests. A major defect
in present theory is that the right is defined solely by the wrong,
and, as a result, there is no need to define the right separately. The
fourth amendment theory must reflect the constitutional assump-
tions of individualism, limited government, and private property.
To say that the amendment protects reasonable expectations of
privacy is not to say why. Privacy embodies a self-justifiable, al-
most spiritual, concept. The belief that "persons, houses, papers,
and effects" should be protected against the reach of government
serves the ideal of human dignity through self-fulfillment and per-
sonal relationships. Privacy is so important as to be an end in it-
self. When government invades our privacy, it injures us in our hu-
manity; but a preference for secrecy and solitude is just the
starting point for an inclusive, objective and sociologically accurate
definition. Such a premise is the beginning of a theory.
The premises must be two dimensional and account for the prag-
matic half of the dualism as well. The text of the fourth amend-
ment admits that even privacy may be disturbed, for an overriding
2. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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social need, under procedural safeguards. Any set of premises
would be incomplete without this second dimension. Law enforce-
ment is one of the most significant of the constitutional police
powers. Some premise must be articulated to serve this broad end.
Furthermore, the premises must complement one another. Some
premise must order the others. Hierarchy is needed. A misconcep-
tion in current theory is that law enforcement always is arrayed
against the individual interest, but this ignores government's ef-
forts to protect us from others who would commit crimes against
us and our privacy.
Breadth distinguishes general premises from more narrow rules
and allows for their adaptation. Recall how technology eclipsed the
old trespass premise of the fourth amendment. Technology has in-
creased government access dramatically. Theoretical responses to
electronic monitors, surveillance with computer data bases, and a
growing crime problem must be even and consistent. Matching slo-
gans, like "privacy" with "law and order," will not do.
Another concern is for a realistic fit between theory and practice.
Consider the avowed preference for a warrant. Most searches are
conducted without a warrant. This concern is not to suggest that
theory should follow reality. The priority of the Constitution is
that reality should conform to theory, but practical consequences
should inform theory. Assuming the posture of an ostrich does not
improve theory or reality.
Generally, fourth amendment theorists have failed to articulate
their assumptions and how they relate theory and practice. Prem-
ises must come first. If we do not know where we are going in, how
can we know where we should come out?
III. STRUCTURE
This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of con-
stitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when
one story too many is added.3
An important result of setting the protection against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures in the Constitution is the judicial respon-
sibility to elaborate a complex and detailed body of law, based on a
3. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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few broad premises. This organization is important because it es-
tablishes the pattern of privacy in our society. In an ideal theory,
the premises order structure and the structure must be orderly to
insure a coherence. Coherence is the result of unity and harmony.
Traditional fourth amendment analysis built upon four ques-
tions; (1) defining the circumstances in which the protection ap-
plied-the scope of the amendment; (2) determining the factors to
be considered in deciding constitutionality-the warrant and rea-
sonableness standards; (3) dictating consequences for viola-
tions-the remedy; and (4) identifying who may raise a violation
and when-standing. Since Katz v. United States,4 these distinct
inquiries have been collapsed into one standard calling for the pro-
tection of privacies variously labelled "reasonable," "justifiable,"
and "legitimate." We can look to Justice Harlan's concurring opin-
ion,5 as most have, for some semblance of structure in objective
and subjective expectations of privacy. However, that becomes a
facade when we ask: first, if the government may undo "subjec-
tive" expectations by notice and, second, if "objective" expecta-
tions are normative and matters of right or merely descriptive of
those the people have in fact.
Unity requires that the parts be related to the whole theory, not
only as distinct levels of analysis, but also as an integrated and
complementary sequence of thought. The text of the amendment
itself poses, but does not resolve, the most basic structural ques-
tion: how the warrant clause and the reasonableness clause relate.
Logic gives three choices: (1) the two clauses are coextensive in
effect, so that warrantless intrusions are per se unreasonable;
(2) although the reasonableness requirement does not authorize
warrantless intrusions, it does require that each warranted intru-
sion also satisfy a separate test for reasonableness; (3) warranted
intrusions are exempted from further examination, and only war-
rantless intrusions must satisfy a reasonableness test. At times, the
Court has given primacy to one clause then to the other, and on
occasion has considered the degree of compliance with both
clauses. The Court even has gone so far as to ignore the structural
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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issue, upholding challenged procedures as adequate substitutes for
the two clauses.
Every theory is faced with irresistible counterexamples, those
situations in which a consistent application would yield an unto-
ward result. An amorphous theory copes by creating endless ad hoc
corollaries, alternative parallel lines of analysis each with an inde-
pendent justification. In a harmonious theory, each component is
justified and each justification is intrinsic in every component.
Structure is weakened when different components of a theory
would yield different results for the same facts. This can happen
now, for example, between the search incident to arrest and the
automobile search exceptions to the warrant requirement. The pre-
sent free-form warrant clause perhaps best illustrates Justice Jack-
son's observation.e The warrant preference itself becomes an
empty promise when a structureless theory allows the magistrate
to wield merely a rubber stamp. Decisions that recognize and apply
warrant exceptions belie an announced preference for warrants and
are inconsistent. Within categories, the exceptions have grown be-
yond their original intrinsic justification. Automobile searches, for
example, can occur long after the police end any exigency.
The collapse of structure underscores the need for unity and
harmony. Failure to satisfy these criteria of coherence leaves the
theory without rigor. Katz destroyed an old structure based on
property and tort concepts, but its promise for a new order is still
unfulfilled. In present theory, borrowed concepts provide ad hoc
rationalizations that defy reconciliation. The temple is not in dan-
ger of collapsing only because it is in ruins already.
IV. METHODOLOGY
[T]o attempt by analysis and exposition to unwind [the Su-
preme Court's fourth amendment decisions] and thereby arrive
at a "true rule" . .. would require the mind of a medieval scho-
lastic. . ..
The content of a theory is filled by methodology. Methodology
holds the structure together and is the means by which the prem-
6. See supra text accompanying note 3.
7. United States v. Sutton, 341 F. Supp. 320, 322 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (Brown, C.J.).
886 [Vol. 30:881
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
ises order the structure. An ideal fourth amendment theory should
establish accepted modes of argument and identify procedures and
techniques that characterize appropriate debate. The theory must
identify what questions to ask and how to go about answering
them, in short, a methodology for analyzing search and seizure is-
sues. Any methodology should be possessed of two quali-
ties-consistency and depth.
It is not enough to invoke a broad premise, to rely on history, to
urge the plain meaning, to argue the framers' intent, to suppose a
functionalism, or to claim to balance interests, each only when the
particular approach supports a perceived right result. The method-
ology should provide consistency by creating a hierarchy for using
these techniques and should establish which techniques apply in
which particular contexts. Beyond consistency, a methodology
should have a certain depth. To achieve consistency at all cost
would not improve methodology. A theory without discernment is
no theory at all.
Our constitutional dualism thus creates a tension in methodol-
ogy between flexibility and fixity. The premises served by the
fourth amendment could generate numerous, complicated, and
subtle rules, but any methodology must be possessed of sufficient
simplicity to allow some measure of certainty or predictability for
all their users. Some approaches tilt toward the aspirational and
some tilt toward the pragmatic, and some others seem to be sus-
pended in between. Although the Court has not articulated an ex-
clusive methodology, several competing methodologies may be con-
sidered toward an understanding of this component of an ideal
theory.
The totality of the circumstances approach, which quickly
passed from the scene, was something of an "un-methodology,"
part of the "I know it when I see it" school, a kind of jurisprudence
of the ad hoc. To have no methodology leaves that central function
unperformed and assigns consistency and depth to the whim of the
decision maker. Such a cataloging of the facts followed by an unre-
lated conclusion on constitutionality does nothing to further a
theory.
A method that solely contemplated reasonableness would appear
completely consistent; each search and seizure would be measured
for reasonableness. Such epithetical jurisprudence often is the easi-
1989]
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est way out of conceptual difficulty. Find a term to which the law
has attached some consequence, apply the term to the situation at
hand, and the legal result is determined automatically. Although
hidden, the slippage in such an approach is often profound. If a
new fact pattern is not truly like the old, the term takes on new
meaning while the familiar form of logical decision has been fol-
lowed. Whatever it means in other fields, in constitutional law a
reasonableness inquiry is so shallow as to be next to meaningless, a
conclusion reached via some unarticulated balance of undisclosed
interests subjectively assigned relative weights. The approach pro-
vides answers but no method for reaching them. Volumes of rea-
sonableness decisions have not provided any more insight than the
years' probable cause decisions, which is not much at all.
From time to time, the Court became enamored with balancing
fourth amendment interests just as it has in other constitutional
areas. Balancing, however, seems to have undone more methodol-
ogy than it has developed. Pure balancing achieves the highest or-
der of flexibility but sacrifices almost all fixity. Ultimate balancing
methodology asks two questions in deciding each case: (1) how
much and what type of privacy does a free society require and
(2) how much and what type of intrusion upon privacy is required
to preserve a reasonably ordered society. A methodology so obtuse
is not particularly helpful, however, when deciding specific cases.
Consistency is lost in plumbing such depths. A breakdown of bal-
ancing methodology further detracts from the approach. The de-
termination of the weight of the government's purpose is virtually
standardless, as it contemplates such imponderables as weighing
the legislative intent for the severity of the crime and the hind-
sighted need for the evidence. No wonder the Court has gone only
so far as applying adjectives such as "legitimate," "weighty," "ur-
gent" or "vital." In the other pan of the balance, the Court must
assign weights to a diverse spectrum of privacy interests in mea-
suring the severity of the intrusion. At one end point, the method-
ology could locate the lowest cognizable interest on the significant
side of a de minimis interest in hiding incriminating evidence and,
at the other end point, the highest privacy interest beyond which
the government may not go. So far the Court has only spoken
about the severity of the intrusion within broad contexts of home
searches in conclusory terms. The Court also might be obliged to
[Vol. 30:881
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balance the feasibility of alternative procedures and the potential
for abuse, although no decision has gone so far. First, the balancing
methodology requires the Court to scale values from several per-
spectives: societal interests, privacy concerns, the efficiency issue,
the potential for abuse, and the alternative administrative burden.
Second, these perspectives must be integrated into a common
methodology of privacy. Admittedly, the intricacy of this approach
may prevent success.
A phenomenon of the last decade, the so-called "bright line rule"
provides the last considered methodology. In the warrant excep-
tion for searches incident to arrest, for example, once the Court
strayed from the original concerns about safety and contraband,
the shift from a functional approach to a doctrinal approach be-
came inevitable. Thus, a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of
an automobile may authorize the full search of the interior com-
partment. The methodology of such bright line rules does have a
certain simplicity, but simplifying police procedures alone is not a
sound methodology. Even devotees of bright lines suggest criteria
for evaluating them: (1) Does the rule have clear and certain
boundaries that minimize the need for case-by-case evaluation?
(2) Do results under the rule approximate projected results under
an impracticable case-by-case evaluation? (3) Is there a genuine
need to forego an otherwise impracticable case-by-case approach?
and (4) Is the rule not readily manipulable? The bright-line meth-
odology is acceptable only if we can with confidence answer each
question in the affirmative. Otherwise, a straightforward doctrinal
approach is preferred for consistency and depth.
Methodology is crucial to the formulation and legitimacy of any
theory. Consistency and depth allow some evaluation of methodol-
ogies, but the former cannot become a foolish theory's hobgoblin
and the latter cannot be pursued to infinite regress. The extant
methodologies might be viewed as complementary efforts to
achieve a deeper understanding of the premises and structure of
the fourth amendment. The Court can be faulted for beginning
and ending in the middle of the sequence. Premises must order a
structure before an ordered methodology may be achieved. Ironi-
cally, the Court's preoccupation with methodology, to the exclusion
of premises and structure, prevents an accommodation of method-
1989]
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ologies. Only when this preoccupation is overcome will the dark
ages of theory end.
V. BOUNDARIES
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the indi-
vidual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees
him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity
so necessary in the true administration of justice.8
Every theory must define outer limits beyond which it cannot go.
Theoretical boundaries ought to be precise at the limits and inter-
nally uniform. Before exploring the fourth amendment boundaries
of content and substance, consider the significance of that border.
Deciding that the conduct involved is within the amendment does
not outlaw the technique, but merely imposes judicial supervision.
Principles of neutrality, sufficiency and particularity are triggered,
sometimes before and always after. Beyond the border, the con-
duct is exempt of constitutional control. The line keeps straight
burglars and government.
The orbit of the fourth amendment has some perigee and apo-
gee. At minimum, the amendment protects interests akin to prop-
erty and torts, interests in possessions, bodily integrity, and mental
tranquility. At maximum, the amendment protects those interests
plus the broadest sense of secrecy and solitude-the liberty to
keep personal information unknown to others and to keep oneself
separate from others-whether from individuals or from govern-
ment. For our boundary-drawing to achieve an optimum level of
privacy, theory must distinguish between the protection of the
right to certain expectations and protections of actual expecta-
tions. Missing in the Katz objective-subjective expectations analy-
sis is the precise inquiry into what we are entitled to expect from
government, independent of what government might allow us to
expect.
Several limiting techniques exist. A means-oriented model in-
vokes the general search paradigm of unconstitutionality and ex-
pands or contracts by analogy and precedent in the common law
8. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (Clark, J.).
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tradition. An atomistic model focuses on the personal constitu-
tional right, drawing a protective barrier around individual inter-
ests in secrecy and security. A regulatory model focuses on the col-
lective "right of the people" to be protected against law
enforcement excesses. Precision is lost, however, when the limits of
the theory are defined differently for different searches Fourth
amendment boundaries blur when, for example, administrative
searches follow a means model and standing doctrine follows an
atomistic model and the exclusionary rule follows a regulatory
model. Such a hegemony will not do.
When drawing the boundary, the theory should explain the sig-
nificance, if any, of the accused's interest in avoiding the result of
the search and punishment. Beyond the debate over remedy, ex-
clusion and insulation from prosecution have warped fourth
amendment theory regarding the scope of the protection, who can
raise claims, and the various doctrines of warrant preference and
exceptions. This distortion narrows the scope of the protection and
blurs conceptual limits. The ideal theory would overcome this
seeming inability to address the remedy directly by defining it in a
reasoned and uniform manner. A metatheory would expect a uni-
formity in doctrine of right and remedy, for the two play an indi-
visible role in drawing boundaries. This approach calls for a single
boundary, within generous limits, which contemplates general min-
imization of violations and compensation and punishment for par-
ticular violations. The bifurcated approach we have is unconvinc-
ing and conspicuously unstable.
Related to the question of boundary is the inquiry into the to-
pology of the theory, the use of intensity to define outer reaches.
As a pebble hits a pond, the theory could posit an inviolate inter-
est in privacy that emanates outward and weakens as it moves
away from core values. Intensity could determine the legitimacy of
activity by imposing progressive procedural protections until
reaching a fourth amendment sanctum sanctorum. Interests in
bodily integrity, the home, and highly private papers are examples
of the most important values in such a hierarchy. Even if feasible,
this approach may expect too much internal uniformity. Indeed,
much of the vacillation in existing theory may be attributed to
subjectivity in shifting emphases and changing perceptions of pri-
vacy. The intensity inquiry, at most, reinforces conclusions at the
19891
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extreme that a given situation is within or without the boundary of
the theory.
Boundaries of theory must be marked by a sound methodology.
Structure also is influential. To be precise at the limits and inter-
nally uniform, a boundary must be true to the premises of a the-
ory. Without boundaries, we cannot know the limits of thought
about the fourth amendment. Reason and truth require no more
nor no less for the individual and for government.
VI. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, the Court's work in the fourth amendment area is as
difficult as it is important. The persistence of the same fact situa-
tions, the same issues, and the same uncertainties, however, sug-
gests that its theory is at fault. The voice of fourth amendment
scholarship must lead this dialogue toward harmony. We must ar-
ticulate some premises, build a structure, agree on a methodology,
and define the boundary, in our theory. We must follow the
metatheory sequence until we reach the central paradoxes that
mark our constitutional dualism. Asking new questions of our the-
ory, we need to formulate new answers, new ways of thinking, even
new theories about the fourth amendment. A metatheory will help
that effort and, perhaps, along the way make angels better dancers.
Whatever the state of present and future theory, our under-
standing of those fifty-four words keeps fiction from becoming
prediction:
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were be-
ing watched at any given moment .... It was even more con-
ceivable that they watched everybody all the time .... You had
to live-did live, from habit that became instinct-in the as-
sumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except
in darkness, every movement scrutinized.9
9. G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949).
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